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The Tea Gardens of Assam and Bengal:
Company Rule and Exploitation
of the Indian Population During
the Nineteenth-Century
Gabrielle LaFavre
Contemporary agents of the East India Company claim that the organization
stimulated development in the Indian sub-continent, but the formation of the
Assam Company only benefited a certain proportion of the Indian population—
the urban elite. Establishing tea plantations in the countryside conversely
impoverished the rural populations—this paper will explore the extent to which
Company Rule, in particular the tea gardens and plantations of nineteenthcentury Assam and Bengal, impoverished and exploited the rural inhabitants of
India, as well as pan-Indian laborers. These plantations followed the mold first set
by the East India Company, and by contrasting their separate, but intertwined,
histories, it is possible to posit wider questions about colonial rule, such as the
large-scale subjugation of the Indian nation as a whole.
After securing a commercial monopoly and relaxing taxes for Europeans
in order to stimulate their economic progress, private British managers and
producers enjoyed unchallenged power and free access to resources and labor—all
under the approving eye of the Crown. These private businessmen created a rigid
plantation-structure that dislodged the traditional Indian positions of authority
and simultaneously extracted as much labor as possible from their workforce—
without substantial costs of production. Tea plantations achieved a high profit
margin by means of coercive labor recruitment, low employee wages, an ethnic
division of the work force, and inhumane living and working conditions—both
on the plantations and in the surrounding villages. It is due to this pattern of
economic exploitation that Company Rule on Indian tea plantations prevented
local development and sustained an environment of colonial control in Assam and
Bengal well into the twentieth century.
The East India Company developed as the primary trade company to advance
British interests, and this umbrella business extracted Indian labor and resources.
A more specific examination of the Assam Company, a descendent of the East
India Company itself, reveals that the tea plantations of the nineteenth century
were microcosms of larger political and economic issues that allowed the British
traders and rulers to oppress the Indian people under Company Rule—the
reverberations of which are still felt on the sub-continent to this day, evident in
the widespread poverty and illiteracy of much of the population.
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E

uropean powers oppressed India, keeping it as a colony until the nation
finally gained independence in 1947. To this day, large portions of the
Indian population remain poor and illiterate, and although the economy is
growing on the whole, India has not been able to recognize its full potential
since. One of the methods with which Great Britain prevented Indian
development was through the East India Company; although colonialism
brought transportation networks, new infrastructure, and education to
privileged sections of the Indian population that resided in cites, entities
such as the East India Company ultimately did more to impoverish—not
benefit—rural India. The East India Company, and its later tea subsidiaries
and conglomerates, extracted Indian resources and abused indigenous
inhabitants. One of the most oppressive tea subsidiaries, the Assam Company,
formed out of a merger with the Bengal Tea Association in 1840. Studying
Company Rule through the history of the East India Company and the Assam
Company serves as a vessel with which to address the larger historiographic
issue of the drain enacted by the metropole: whereby European nations
benefited economically, socially, and politically—all at the expense of their
colonies. In particular, Assam and Bengal, two of the largest tea producing
regions in India, demonstrate the ways in which Company Rule not only
created a colonial economy of exploitation, but also perpetuated social and
economic underdevelopment in India.
By the 1880s, tea, once a symbol of upper class luxury, became the
“cheapest and most widely used drink amongst the common people” in
Europe.1 Tea first increased in popularity during the 1830s, and the demand
for this product, especially in Great Britain, soared; the British public
accounted for roughly 88% of all tea use, and their patterns of consumption
boosted market expansion.2 Previously, Chinese tea dominated the world
economy, but by 1888 Indian tea established itself as the chief product of
European consumers.3 However, with this increase in demand came the
formation of smaller entrepreneurial bodies such as the Assam Company,
which essentially followed the exploitative practices that the East India
Company had already established. The East India Company initiated a string
of government-supported private entities that possessed sovereignty in Indian
provinces from the eighteenth-century on. With the growth of the East
India Company and the tea industry, other companies began to form; the
similarities between these entities gives rise to the question: to what extent
do the private tea gardens, under the direction of companies like the Assam
Company, embody the ways in which Britain exploited India as a whole?
The tea plantations of Assam and Bengal illustrates how the government
worked with the East India Company to destabilize and exploit the
indigenous rural people, and on many levels, tea plantations can be viewed
as microcosms of the East India Company itself, especially in terms of larger
political and economic issues. Although Sen Sudipta argues “colonial rule in
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India has often been studied from the perspective of the British Raj of the
nineteenth century,” he laments that “there are relatively few studies that treat
the period of Company rule as the initial and perhaps crucial phase of colonial
expansion”;4 this claim underlines the fact that Crown Rule prefigured
Company Rule, and the establishment of Company Rule paved the way for
later oppression against the Indian people.
The Assam Company united with the Bengal Tea Association on
January 16, 18405, and this entity best illuminates the colonial abuses of tea
plantations throughout Asia because Bengal and Assam became the world’s
largest tea growing regions, due to the British system of exploitation there.
More than any other conglomerate, the Assam Company displaced local
rulers and established an economic monopoly by skewing taxes and land
ownership opportunities in favor of British interest—similar to how the
East India Company usurped traditional systems of power in other domains
of trade. After Lord William Bentnick, aided by an Indian leader named
Maniram Dewan, discovered indigenous tea in India in 1834, Company
Rule utilized—and even intensified—existing exploitative practices.6 The
Assam Company maintained a substantial profit level despite competition
from Chinese tea by keeping labor costs down, implementing coercive tactics
of labor recruitment, deepening ethnic cleavages to prevent unified dissent
and group consciousness, and ignoring Indian economic development in
favor of private British gains. Ultimately, tea companies in India, especially
the Assam Company, drew upon tactics of the East India Company, but
took these avaricious measures a step further and created their own systems
of damage and abuse which locked the Indian sub-continent into a cycle of
indebtedness for decades. The tea company rule of the nineteenth century
mirrors the East India Company and reveals the practices and methods
underlying colonial exploitation on a larger scale; such a study helps to explain
why India continued to remain subjugated for decades after colonial rule
formally ended.
This paper details the oppressive practices and inequitable levying of taxes
first instituted by the East India Company, as well as how this established
an abusive model which tea companies later modified to achieve their own
profits at the expense of local Indian inhabitants. Next, an exploration of the
Assam Company, which epitomizes the larger characteristics of tea Company
Rule in general, illuminates how plantations drew upon the East India Model
in order to legitimize raising Indian taxes, sustaining oppressive conditions
on the tea gardens, recruiting labor in order to divide their workforce, and
subjugating neighboring towns and villages; in short, the Assam Company
serves as a microcosm of colonial exploitation, displaying the practices of
Company Rule, as well as how this system prevented Indian development.
Finally, this paper alludes to a specific example of violent Indian reaction
against the continued poverty, illiteracy, and oppression on tea estates, which,
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unfortunately, highlights the connection between the metropole’s colonial
agenda and its adverse effects on India, even today.

I. The East India Company Model, A Vessel for
Colonial Exploitation
William Pitt’s India Act of 1784 gave the “Crown the power of guiding the
politics of India with as little means of corrupt influence as possible,” which,
in effect, established a concrete link between the doings of the East India
Company and the approval of the royal government. Because East India
Company’s products were seen as “necessary returns for public funds and
trust put into the joint stock…Parliament was responsible for raising the
finances to pay for the settlement of trade in the East Indies. The Company
was authorized by letters…under the royal seal of England to make requisite
laws, constitutions, and ordinances,” and this ultimately awarded the
Company sovereign authority in many Indian Provinces.7 Pitt’s Act did little,
if anything, to ameliorate the fraud already rampant within the Company; in
fact, “the India House became a synonym for corruption and faction,”8 and
the Act created an apathetic environment in which the East India Company
pursued its aims by any means—moral or otherwise.9
Following Pitt’s Act, “monopolies both lawful and questionable continued
to exist...indigenous traders, brokers, and subordinates who had thrown in
their lot with the Company Raj were busy adapting to a new regime”.10
This new regime, under the auspices of the East India Company, served
as a precedent for later tea plantations such as the Assam Company, and
they granted indemnity to businessmen who utilized manipulation and
profiteering. The activities of the East India Company encouraged a system
of ‘black agents’ who “dislodged a range of Indian middlemen (usually known
as dadni merchants) who had acted as brokers”.11 This process relocated the
profits of indigenous merchants and traders and placed them into the hands
of British entrepreneurs instead. Consequently, these private British traders
fostered a corrupt environment of insider trading, which allowed them to
accumulate personal wealth—two characteristics which later reappeared on
tea plantations. The East India Company displayed another corrupt practice
which later distinguished the tea gardens of Bengal and Assam: British
merchants seized power from local Mughal emperors by offering an annual
tribute, or bribe, if the Mughals revoked the obligatory revenue payments on
commodity goods; this eliminated European taxes and paved the way for later
inequitable laws, such as the Waste Land Grant Rules of 1838, and led to
Indian oppression.12 The East India Company “set the tone for the expansion
of British and European colonies and economic interests in Asia and the rest
of the world,”13 and one can argue that it laid the groundwork for a powerful
intrusive state which tea companies later utilized as their model. The East
India Company, approved by the government, created a climate of British
dominance that tea plantations used as their basis for subsequent exploitation.
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II. The Assam Company, A Microcosm of Economic
Exploitation Under Colonial Rule
The expansion of the East India Company occurred because the Company
“assumed sole authority to impose customs duties”14 and created customs
houses that expanded revenue, while simultaneously supplanting traditional
Indian trading authorities. The Company explored new realms of agriculture
and commerce, and following the increase in worldwide tea consumption
during the 1830s, a group of British merchants formed the Assam Company
in London on February 12, 1839.15 In order to create a profit in light of
strong Chinese competition, the Assam Company’s main objective was to
acquire an economic monopoly in the tea industry. The Company petitioned
the government to relax tax payments, and by 1854 the Waste Land Rules—
first enacted in 1838 to allow government-granted land to be free of revenue
for twenty years—was in full swing and led to a rapid increase in British
cultivation.16 Later acts, such as the Fee Simple Rules of 1862, the Revised
Fee Simple Rules of 1874, and the New Lease Rules of 1876, further enabled
“British planters to own large tracts of the most fertile land of Assam at highly
concessional rates”.17 These legislations, which directly stemmed from the
East India Company’s customs houses, displaced indigenous inhabitants
and discriminated against aspiring Indian planters. Due to the nature of
colonial capitalism, “only entrepreneurs with huge capital could take up teacultivation. Difficulties for the indigenous entrepreneurs were thus increased
during a nearly three-decade period, initially by the government, and later
by the government and the planters in conjunction,” further alienating local
traders and aspiring Indian businessmen.18
These acts marginalized the Indian people—from traders, to laborers, to
peasants. The Assam Company squatted on “as much land as possible to preempt any future rival,”19 and only one half of land was actually cultivated for
tea, while the other half remained “set aside for future expansion”.20 What
little land remained was out of reach of the local population, literally and
figuratively, because only those with a large amount of capital could risk tea
cultivation. In addition, while British evaded taxation, Indian landowners paid
two rupees per acre to their British masters.21 The peasants who were not
coerced into working in the plantation sector remained “largely subsistence
oriented” and “the bulk…impoverished as a result of rack-renting and
usurious practices of money-lending, [they] did not possess enough capital to
invest it in land reclamation in the district”.22 Indians who did not work for
the tea gardens became impoverished, due to discriminatory land taxes and
duplicitous British loans.
Further, Company Rule maintained its economic hegemony through
violent means as well. The Company took no chances with local competition,
and “aspiring Assamese planters were discriminated against and discouraged
from entering into competition with the British planters”.23 Maniram
Dewan, the Indian leader who had first alerted the British of the presence of
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indigenous tea, resigned from his post with the Assam Tea Company in order
to create his own plantation. However, his land was maliciously classified as
ordinary rice-property and, therefore, subject to very high revenue, which
ultimately discouraged his success and bankrupted his plantation.24 When
Dewan, a threat to British profits as well as a rival businessman, continued
to excel, the Assam Company alleged that he was inciting rebellion; the
Company’s false allegations consequently enabled the government to execute
him in 1858. Following his death, the Company confiscated his land for their
own possession, illustrating the full extent of British corruption.25 Dewan’s
execution also reveals the lengths to which British planters of Company Rule
went in order to sustain complete control of the Assamese and Bengali tea
trade.
As with the East India Company before it, the British monarchy endorsed
the Assam Company and displayed support by transferring two-thirds of
government-owned tea stations to the Company in February of 1840.26 The
Company flourished in this favorable environment, and used this opportunity
to tie down laborers to plantations vis-à-vis subsistence farming, which not
only prevented competition in the sphere of commercial agriculture, but also
made the Indian people “dependent upon their employers for every necessity
of life”.27 Tea estates distributed “a bulk of…surplus land…into small plots
to be distributed among the laborers,”28 but these plots forced Indians
who bought land into a crushing cycle of debt and dependence. It chained
peasants to uncultivated land “by further exploitation of his and his family’s
labour,”29 which was necessary to pay off taxes and loans, and it gave rise to
“a dampening effect on the propensity of the different categories of peasants
to take the risks involved in commercial agriculture”.30 Coupled with this
need to cultivate their own subsistence crops, Indian laborers found that the
price of necessary goods in the market increased, while their wages remained
injudiciously low.31 Many of these peasants turned to plantation labor because
when the British gained control of tax revenues in the 1770s, Indian taxation
increased; labor became the only way they could pay their taxes. This caused
peasants to “quit the land…indebtedness and expropriation from land of the
small peasants created a favorable environment for the [British] planters,” and
the cycle became so severe that many Indians pawned their own freedom as
a last resort.32 Measures such as these, undertaken by the Assam Company
and individual tea plantations, prevented local competition from profiting,
and severely compromised the development of the Indian people and their
economy.
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III. Specific Exploitative Measures of the Assam
Company—Labor, Recruitment, and Private Trade
Perhaps the most gripping example of the exploitation of indigenous peoples
under Company Rule occurred within the realm of labor recruitment. Because
of market competition from Chinese tea, the Assam Company sought to
keep all investments, especially labor costs, as low as possible in order to
increase profit and remain competitive. There was little, if any, mechanization
within the tea plantations, so labor was “the main element in the total cost
of production of tea;”33 therefore, the less that companies spent on labor,
the higher their personal margin of profit would be. In the formative years
of Company Rule, tea gardens created and sustained a hierarchal plantation
structure in which labor was acquired through an indenture system,
characterized by “mobilization of a large unskilled labour force through
non-market mechanism, low wages, extra-legal methods of control and
large scale production through labour-intensive, low-skill methods”.34 This
hierarchy, characterized by a small number of British managers and a large
class of oppressed Indian workers, could not function without force. To
combat the high rate of absconding laborers, the Company enforced “strict
control through penal laws, floggings illegal confinements, and the chowkidari
system,”35 a system in which the British employed watchmen and guard dogs
to prevent desertion and disobedience.36 This example reinforces how British
tea companies cut costs and exploited their workforce, which in turn led to an
increase of disease, malnutrition, and mortality. During one extreme instance,
the British even prohibited laborers from producing rice, the main subsistence
crop for the Indian people, because it was “opposed to the interest of the
Company”37 and ‘interfered’ with tea profits.
In order to guarantee that the workforce was productive, entities such as
the Assam Company constructed false narratives against local laborers and
“raised a hue and cry about local labour due to the alleged unwillingness of
Assamese agricultural laborers to work in tea gardens”.38 British entrepreneurs
ignored the favorable balance of indigenous inhabitants and land, as ignored
the fact that the fertile soil allowed peasants to grow rice with little effort or
capital—reasons which, if acknowledged, would have explained why local
people were not interested in working on the plantations.39 It is because
of these factors that Assamese and Bengali inhabitants had little incentive
to tea cultivators, a labor-intensive occupation. In addition, tea companies
offered arbitrarily low wages and only a “substantial monetary inducement”
would have caused Indian people to voluntarily labor in tea gardens.40 No
such monetary inducement existed, and government works such as railroad
production offered higher wages—thus attracting local labor more easily.
Because the Bengali and Assamese inhabitants did not willingly seek
employment with them, tea companies therefore dismissed indigenous people
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as lazy. A civil servant in Bengal during this period wrote: “the village folk do
not, as a rule, work harder than they are compelled to do…so long as their
urgent wants are satisfied they do not care to exert themselves…they do no
more than they must”.41 Because of this discriminating narrative against local
peoples, planters coerced laborers from other regions, and ultimately produced
a system of neo-slavery that ensnared workers from vast distances throughout
the entire sub-continent.
Recruiting labor from foreign districts solved many issues, especially
because tea companies considered local labor to be “expensive and risky”42; for
one, local laborers were more likely to protest poor conditions and garner the
support of the neighboring villages. To prevent this type of unrest, companies
sought labor from far distances. Unlike local labor, immigrant workers were
easier for plantations to control because they could not “trek back home
whenever they had reason to be dissatisfied with the Company”.43 Immigrant
laborers could be “exploited and ill-treated without much impact on the
surrounding villages,” and therefore, tea companies preferred their labor.44
The Assam Company further claimed that immigrant laborers from regions
such as Bhagalpore, Chittagong, and Dacca were “physically stronger than the
weak Benglaies” and more capable of “understanding hard work in the jungle;”
therefore, they were “better suited to the unhealthy climate of the districts of
Assam”.45 In actuality, many foreign workers, such as Bengali Muslims,
could not survive the Assamese climate, and the foreign worker mortality rate
reached 35 per cent on the plantations.46 These foreign laborers, derogatorily
referred to as “hill coolies, dhangar and boonah (jungle-dwelling),”47 were
easier to exploit than local people and companies could keep them illiterate,
and therefore ignorant of their rights.48 Tea companies coerced aboriginal
laborers from tribes and lower castes, and because they constituted the lowest
position, socially inferior to even the bottom caste,49 tea managers exploited
this vulnerability and reduced them to the “private property,” or slaves, of the
Company.50
Because Company Rule sought to keep labor costs as low as possible, it
was necessary to coerce foreign laborers in light of such low wages. Potential
workers from alien districts had little incentive to travel far distances to
the plantations because the “sufferings and high death rates were common
knowledge…and further efforts to procure a fresh supply [of laborers] proved
to be increasingly unsuccessful;”51 consequently, importing labor necessitated
an intensive recruiting network. Sardari recruitment developed to forcibly
entice workers from distant regions, and bribery and trickery characterized
it. Sadars, natives trusted by British companies to appeal to the indigenous
people, worked as intermediaries and registered laborers in districts far from
their home.52 Similar to sadars, native arkatis served as middlemen because
they knew how to induce their peers to become laborers. They used both “fair
means and foul” to secure peasant labor for tea companies.53 Ultimately, the
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combined effort of the British planters and their labor recruiters created a
deceitful system, which caused peasants throughout India to surrender their
lands and resign themselves to kamiouti, or forced labor, because they believed
they had no other option.54
Companies hired contractors based on commission, and as a result, these
labor recruiters cared more for the amount of laborers they supplied than for
the wellbeing of these workers.55 Consequently, “mortality of coolies on the
voyage up between 1861 and 1863 was caused by overcrowding, insufficient
and improper food supplied on the voyage and total neglect of the coolies both
as regards to medical treatment and cleanliness;” sadly, overcrowding became
so excessive that people were crushed in transit, before they even arrived on
a tea plantation.56 Conditions on vessels transporting laborers, as well as
accommodations of the plantations themselves, were unclean; they increased
the probability of diseases such as cholera.57 After the British government
passed Act III in 1863, which officially licensed and ‘regulated’ the recruiting
system, recruitment activity increased. The mortality rate in every shipment of
alien laborers approached 50 percent as a result, and companies “shipped them
[the recruits] as if they were cattle,” thus transforming the tea laborer “into a
commodity and a virtual slave”.58
Another negative ramification of labor recruitment occurred because tea
plantations introduced and reinforced ethnic divides. Companies purposefully
imported an mélange of ethnic and religious groups so that workers’ struggles
could not “crystallise into a unified and organized labour movement in the
Assam Valley”.59 Once on a plantation, workers could not unite because
people “coming from a distant and scattered area were less powerful,” and
therefore, less cohesive.60 Colonial capitalism deepened “ethnic cleavages
among the mass of the plantation labourers, brought about ethnic and class
solidarity among the managerial and intermediary class,” while the laborers
remained strictly divided by ethnicity, language, and religion.61 This practice
reflected the larger colonial trend of ‘divide and rule’ that bodies of British
authority, such as the East India Company, commonly practiced during the
nineteenth century.
Entities such as the Assam Company further prevented mass protest
by isolating their divided workforce from the outside world. The Assam
Company enacted measures of ‘discipline’ in various ways: “they [the laborers]
were compelled to reside within the vicinity of the gardens; their mobility
within and outside the plantations was severely restricted; they were isolated
from the outside world; and they were made completely dependent on their
employers”.62 The struggles that developed on the plantations remained
isolated, and no links could emerge in such a detached climate. Laborers, both
native and foreign to the Assam Valley, were not allowed to leave the estates,
and chowkidars prevented them from contacting villagers nearby. Enforced
isolation inhibited “the development of class consciousness…by maintaining
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a strict physical control”.63 This gross exploitation reduced workers to the
position of neo-slaves.64
Just as private inland trade developed during the early years of the East
India Company, the Company Rule of tea conglomerates, such as the Assam
Company, encouraged private gain at the expense of local development. Inland
trading “of salt and other status goods was considered a scene of the most
tyrannic and oppressive conduct that was known in any age or country,”65 and
this created a basis for exploitation in the realm of tea production later. Private
tea managers reaped enormous profits and refused to invest in surrounding
villages. During “the years of tea mania everybody was quietly busy making
his own fortune”66 and private merchants established extravagant lifestyles for
themselves—often in stark juxtaposition to the poverty that characterized the
plantations and the neighboring villages.
The real profit from these tea estates ended up in “the hands of the owners
and managers in the form of profits or salary,” as they received a salary
ten times the size of their common laborers.67 In this way, tea plantations
mirrored greater exploitative trends of the East India Company as a whole—
especially because, as a result of these practices, North Bengal and the Assam
Valley remained severely underdeveloped.68 Urban centers did spring up near
plantations, but they catered mostly to the needs of the tea gardens and “failed
to grow into viable trade and commercial centers” for local people.69 Although
a member of the British civil service claimed that “the Charter Act of 1813
directed that out of the annual surplus revenues of British India ‘a sum of not
less than one lakh of rupees’ should be set apart and applied to ‘the revival
and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives
of India,”70 the overwhelming majority of the profits from Assam gardens
actually “enriched Britain and benefited British citizens”.71 British planters
did not invest in charitable organizations or state development, and preferred
to hoard their profits. Tea companies, supported by the British government,
utilized exploitative means, just as the East India Company furthered
European interests at the expense of the non-Western indigenous population.

IV: Microcosm of the East India Company
Economic Model—Why It Matters
The Company Rule of tea estates, such as the Assam Company in
both Assam and Bengal, illustrates the East India Company’s corruption
on a smaller, more specific level—yet it further reveals the oppression of
colonial powers throughout the world. Due to “a high level of demand for
Indian tea, weakness of competition from other foreign or Indian planters,
a very low price of land for gardens, a low requirement of initial capital
investment, cheap labour, elementary technical requirement and public
patronage,” tea companies were able to thrive economically and to oppress
the people of India.72 After the discovery of indigenous tea in India in 1834,
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the Assam Company created and controlled plantations in the regions of
Bengal and Assam that microcosmically resembled the exploitative practices
of the East India Company, and by extension, colonial rule as a whole.
These tea gardens instituted an economic monopoly of land, duties, and
trade; displaced traditional middlemen; and discriminated against aspiring
indigenous planters. As a result of this monopoly, Company Rule locked
Indian laborers into a cycle of indebtedness and introduced ethnic cleavages,
by means of foreign recruitment, which prevented protest and the formation
of class-consciousness. The lack of class-consciousness ultimately enabled the
atrocious living and working conditions on tea plantations, and prevented
the economic and social development of the Indian people. Company Rule
became just one example of the colonial drain—the drain which subjugated
non-European colonies for centuries.
Today, the colonial legacy of tea plantations and of the Assam Company
lives on. In 1987, “out of about 620 tea gardens in the Brahmaputra Valley,
only about 158 are owned by Assamese planters. However, most of these
gardens are small in size…and many do not even have their own factories”.73
Current British planters maintained the hegemony that their ancestors
forcibly established during Company Rule until very recently, and to this
day, they retain a large amount of plantation ownership. As time progresses,
more Indian people have become plantation owners and managers. However,
even with this trend towards Indian control of the tea sector, many Indian
management executives retain the tools and techniques of the British
colonial model and continue to oppress their rural workers. On May 30,
2003, incensed workers on a tea estate in Assam bunt set fire to their deputy
manager because oppression still rages on, and all other forms of protest
have not attracted attention or improved conditions.74 Extreme examples of
protest such as this murder highlight why it is important to study the colonial
period of Company Rule during the nineteenth-century in Assam and Bengal;
because tea plantations fostered an environment conducive to the violation of
human rights, the industry has been able to exploit Indian workers for over
two hundred years. Because “the legacy of the colonial days has been cherished
and nourished consciously in the gardens even half a century after the end of
the raj,”75 it is imperative to study this period critically and analytically, so
that society can find a way to end the exploitation that continues to subjugate
India.
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